INTRODUCTION
The environment of contemporary warfare demands an examination of how dominance in battlefield technology is changing the manner in which America fights its wars. The wars of the twentieth century witnessed the most destructive forces in the history of warfare as weaponry advancements improved the efficiency of destroying the adversary's forces and facilities, while concurrently the practical restraints on the use of arms diminished. From ancient times to the present military leaders have balanced moral considerations with military necessity in order to achieve desired results on the battlefield. Today, the ability to see first, understand first, and to act first, has not made it easier to reconcile the two. Arguably, from the U.S. military's perspective it is becoming more difficult to balance them as potential adversaries disperse, move into urban environments, and co-mingle with non-combatants. Moreover, the military's increasing reliance on digital technology, standoff weapon systems, and rapid maneuver push the commander farther away from the moral consequences of his actions and present new challenges for the commander to promptly judge when the line is crossed. The evolution of battlefield dispersion and the concurrent development in the ability to strike the enemy from a distance increasingly test the standards of just war tradition as improvements in weapons accuracy raise the standards of expectation for compliance in law and to moral values of just war tradition.
Since the end of the Cold War the United States has increasingly become captivated with the concept that decisive victory is achievable in limited war, a notion that was unthinkable during the Cold War in which limited wars prudently mitigated the risk of nuclear escalation with Warsaw Pact forces.
1 Correspondingly, since 1991 the United States military has become involved in more wars and military engagements, simultaneously drawing upon a larger percentage of its military resources, than it ever has in the preceding forty-five years.
Sensitivities to U.S. involvement in a multitude of conflicts ranging from the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have generated criticism of U.S. foreign policy, which has spilled over into criticism of how the U.S. military fights. Much of this criticism, fueled by global media networks and influenced by social biases, is unfounded from the position of international law. Possibly, no country other than the U.S. has placed so much emphasis on minimizing the destruction of war--however challenging that is-through the development of technology and indoctrination of its force. However, the United States' prominent world stature combined with a notable increase in the number of global military engagements and activities that emphasize decisive victory will continue to draw criticism from adversaries and friends alike.
Where perceptions carry the weight of reality even adherence to law will not suffice in satisfying all voices contrary to U.S. policy. 
Definitions:
2 Ethics: The discipline dealing with good and bad and with moral duty and obligation; a set of moral principles or values; the principles of conduct governing an individual or group.
Jus ad bellum: Justice towards war; just reasons to go to war.
Jus in bello: Justice in war; just conduct during war.
Jus post bellum: Justice after war; trial and punishment of war criminals.
2 Author's note. Definitions are by the author as interpreted through multiple source documents. Definitions of morality and ethics are borrowed from Merriam-Webster dictionary and are shortened to fit the intent of this monograph. Due to the overlap of meanings of the two terms with one another and with the term, just war values, all three are used interchangeably throughout this monograph, unless otherwise noted. James H. Toner writes that in absolute terms, "ethics refers to theory, and morality to behavior," but this distinction fails when one discusses "ethical conduct" (behavior) or "moral attitude" (theory). James H. Toner, Truth Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics, (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 8-9. Just war tradition: An evolutionary idea or body of scholarship that emphasizes moral justification and judgment of political or military activities before, during, and after warfare; often described alternatively as just war theory.
Morality: A doctrine or system of moral conduct or virtue, where moral is defined as of or relating to principles of right and wrong behavior; conformity to ideals of right human conduct.
Assumptions
The United States always attempts to fight operationally with good intent and with the goal of minimizing collateral damage and non-combatant casualties.
Due to the near absence of practical restraints on offensive combat from ground and air systems the United States can attack nearly any target on the battlefield at its choosing.
Dispersion, standoff attack, and the complex, rapid pace of joint operations make target discrimination more problematic than in previous eras when the speed of the battle was limited to the rate of troop and vehicle movements and to mainly one-dimensional operations by individual services.
Chapter One poses the question whether contemporary American warfare remains consistent with the mores of just war, given the assumptions that the U.S. fights with the view toward minimizing extraneous destruction, yet the rapid pace and dispersion on the battlefield make it more difficult to trace the consequences of operational activity. The next chapter explains the methodology for researching this topic with emphasis on operational standoff attack as it impinges on the moral conduct of war. Chapter Two also explains the organization of the monograph.
METHODOLOGY
The monograph examines whether and how contemporary American-style warfare tests the principles of the just conduct of war (jus in bello) convention within the broader just war tradition. This monograph identifies areas in which the U.S. military can improve adherence to just war standards without sacrificing the legal principle of military necessity, while acknowledging areas in which U.S. military activity commendably fulfills just war concepts.
This work draws extensively on empirical evidence gathered from recent conflicts, joint doctrine, and legal decisions to establish conclusions and make recommendations. It addresses concerns from the perspective of plans and operations at the joint operational level of war with specific emphasis on targeting.
Just war tradition, or just war theory, is nothing more than the name implies: a tradition or theory. It is only an idea, developed from philosophical, religious, cultural, and legal values that most states acknowledge and observe to the degree in which it suits their purposes, practically or morally, or both. The traditional moral principles of just war tradition have largely either been subsumed by positive law of war, customary law, or have limited practical use for commanders today; however, the values inherent to those principles still remain important to the military. Just war tradition is commonly understood to possess two conventions, although a third convention (jus post bellum) has recently emerged and is explained in the next chapter. The first, known as jus in bello theory, involves justice in warfare or the moral conduct of warfare and the second includes jus ad bellum theory, or justice towards war. The former convention entails methods of warfare; hence, the military becomes the primary actor responsible for adherence to its standards. Jus in bello theory includes tests for the principles of proportionality and discrimination. Jus ad bellum theory belongs primarily in the realm of policy decision-making; so therefore, is excluded from the discussion save for its relevance to jus in bello theory. This work focuses on the moral conduct of warfare (jus in bello) in the spectrum of conflict commonly recognized as conventional war or high intensity conflict, but addresses, as necessary, points on the spectrum ranging from Operations Other Than War (OOTW) to high intensity conflict. On the extreme end of the spectrum of warfare, the discussion of the necessity and use of nuclear weapons represents the strongest case for just war standards. Pacifists, moralists, and military leaders, alike, share common views on the subject. Many of their arguments are beyond reproach, either from a moral or practical standpoint and lie in a completely different frame of strategic consideration; therefore, this discussion is omitted.
3 Furthermore, the use of chemical and biological weapons in war is excluded from the discussion except when necessary to illustrate a point on the moral qualities of weapons.
The organization of the monograph is as follows: The work has six chapters, three of which contain front matter, methodology, and back matter. More descriptively, chapter three describes the commonly-accepted principles of the just war conventions, provides a description of the ecclesiastical evolution of just war tradition, and explains the relevance of just war tradition to U.S. military leaders today.
Chapter four is divided into two sections. The first section elaborates the environment and nature of weapons of modern war and the second section describes how these create ethical dilemmas for the operational leader. The first section explains that the environment in which 3 Michael Walzer comprehensively discusses the dilemma of nuclear deterrence and its implications for just war theory. Most experts agree that no moral justification existed for a massive nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the practical impact notwithstanding. However, arguments for limited use still have merit; and therefore, have served to justify the continued possession of nuclear weapons today. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1977), 275-7. potential adversaries reside makes target discrimination especially difficult. The threats include organized forces, guerillas, terrorists, armed civilians, and criminals, all of whom will likely disperse, remain obscure, and operate near sensitive facilities and persons in urbanized settings as American overmatch in firepower and maneuver compels them to seek advantage in a nontraditional warfare environment. Also, weapons are qualitatively amoral, but the consequences of their use can be ascertained as immoral, particularly as the use of advanced weapon systems may create unique challenges for the tests of both discrimination and proportionality. The second section describes that battlefield dispersion has pushed the opponents of war farther away from one another, presenting a challenge to discrimination on the battlefield. Subsequently, battlefield dispersion has led to a physical elongation of standoff attack. The ability to project force anywhere at anytime on the battlefield serves to remove the practical limitations of force and may gravitate toward the use of the most destructive tools to attack a given target. Even the use of precision guided munitions may lead toward greater risks in target selection. Finally, American reliance on high technology in communications and command posts tends to place the commander farther away from the moral implications of his decisions. The rapid pace of the attack, combined with standoff, serves to dehumanize conflict and compounds the problems of command and control of forces across a broad battlefield.
Chapter five provides recommendations for improving U.S. observance of just war standards, as well as the law of war, which formalizes many principles of just war tradition. The recommendations include improvements in the areas of operations, planning, doctrine, training and education, and weapon system assessment.
Having described the methodology and organization of the monograph, the next chapter commences with an explanation of the commonly acknowledged principles of the just war conventions, to include a brief account their ecclesiastical evolution and their relevance to current U.S. military leaders.
JUST WAR Just War Theory
What is just war theory? Historically, just war theory has been driven by two paramount questions: When is war legitimate and how does a military limit force in wartime?
The search for the answers to these questions has pervaded every military endeavor from the time of Alexander the Great to the present, but it was not until the nexus of the Age of Reason and Christian morality did the theory become substantiated and a tradition emerge. The criteria commonly found in modern just war tradition include a legitimate authority directing war for a just cause and the right intention. Warfare must also have a reasonable expectation for success, must possess proportionality, must embody just conduct, and be used only as a last resort. All of these criteria, save just conduct, are collectively known as the jus ad bellum (justice towards war) convention. The just conduct convention is known as jus in bello (justice in war) and is the emphasis of this monograph. The rules of just conduct (jus in bello) include the principles of discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination means identifying legitimate targets, such as combatants, vice non-combatants, and proportionality means using force commensurate with the ends desired. The latter principle overlaps jus ad bellum proportionality in that the ends must be proportional to the means; however, jus in bello proportionality applies strictly to the amount of force used to achieve a military end. In the twentieth century the jus in bello principles have been expanded into three principles enacted in the International Law of Armed Conflict. These principles include military necessity, proportionality, and humanity. Military necessity assumes that there are times in which non-combatants will be inadvertently attacked, but the military benefit and corresponding long term preservation of life, outweighs the short term non-combatant casualties, the impact of which is known as the principle of double effect. The principle of proportionality remains as stated and the principle of humanity serves to limit the suffering of 
Evolution of the Ecclesiastical Stream of Just War Tradition
According to just war scholar James T. Johnson the development of western just war tradition is analogous to "a river of ideas and practice moving through history" in which specific "streams" of disciplines course along, sometimes combining, sometimes diverging, to form the body of modern tradition. 4 The widest and most defining of these streams include religious and philosophical thought; however, other streams include secular law, military experience, and political custom. Christian ethical practice has provided the foundation to just war tradition and philosophy has provided a rational means of intercourse among the various streams. The evolution of just war tradition is complex and it is comprised of a perpetual interaction across the streams. war is undertaken as a last resort, the innocent must be protected during the war, and upon the end of hostilities the vanquished must be treated lawfully and with humility. 
Relevance of Just War Tradition
Why is just war tradition a logical and viable guidepost to the conduct of American warfare? First, in the modern era just war tradition is an idea, not a set of rules that is binding on However, the relationship between modern law and morality is problematic. The dominant legal opinion maintains that laws already exist that regulate the conduct of warfare; therefore, there is no need for injecting morality into the analysis of methods. The position of positive law is well substantiated, particularly as it applies to the U.S. law of war, but is more complicated when applied to international law, where authority is not universally recognized and a comprehensive legal system is absent. 13 Just war tradition is often broader than international law and can account for emerging doctrine and technology, the likes of which may yet be 13 Proponents of the philosophical branch of law concerning positive law, known as Positivism, assert that law is devoid of metaphysical content, such as moral obligations, and it is coincidental that some laws reflect identical principles of morality. The merits or demerits of the law, although important in its construction, are not relevant once law is posited (Christopher p. 114) . The Positivists' argument also contends that law is a self-contained, coherent system that is established by a constituted authority that enforces law. This view works well within a sovereign state, but encounters difficulty at the international level, for what constitutes a common authority? Is the international system of law coherent and enforceable? Seen in this vein adherence to international law appears voluntary, an act of faith and charity. Proponents of the Positivist argument counter that common recognition of international law by states even without means to enforce it is still effective. Moreover, sanctions can enforce law at the international level and the lack of common international enforcing authority is little different than when an individual wins a case against the federal government. The federal government is not compelled to pay damages to the individual by a higher authority, but does so out of a sense of moral justice ).
Renowned Oxford law philosopher H.L.A. Hart takes the Positivists' argument a step further by concurring that law and morality are distinct in advanced societies, but the existence of an enforcing authority is not a prerequisite for constituting law. Operative rules in primitive societies, or pre-legal societies, are seen differently than in advanced societies. In pre-legal societies there is little distinction between rules and morality. (Christopher p. 117) . Individuals have an obligation to a set of primary legal rules derived from custom, practice, and group morals. When the pre-legal society establishes a set of secondary rules, such as a constitution, then it is seen to have developed into an advanced society with a system of law. The advanced society with its secondary rules delineates between law and morality; thus, in the advanced society the merits of law only apply to the construction of law and not to its existence. Furthermore, Hart asserts, in advanced societies enforcement is not an indispensable requirement for law because most people in advanced societies internalize law and behave accordingly without the thought of punishment. However, those that have an external view of the law comply under the threat of punishment; and therefore, enforcement is still necessary, though not a determinant for the existence of law.
Hart contends that the international community is like the pre-legal society that lacks a secondary set of rules. Treaties and customary law can serve in this regard, but they act as sets of rules and not as part of a coherent, enclosed legal system. This does not suggest that individual states are not bound to international law, but demonstrates the ambiguity that arises when the Positivists' view is applied to international law. Therefore, without effective means of international enforcement, the most reasonable means of guaranteeing observance to law is in the internalization of law by individual states. Paul P. unimaginable. International law, on the other hand, is sometimes slow to adapt and is frequently adopted by only those who intend to obey it--perhaps an overly equivocal legal position--however, the plank is incessantly driven by the search for consensus among a multitude of states with competing agendas.
14 Regardless of the relationship between law and morality, "moral principles do serve as a metaphysical bridge that links legal decisions to justice in those cases where the letter of the law is inadequate."
15 In a practical sense, just war values can assist commanders in determining relative values within the proportionality principle of the law of war when analyzing courses of action. In other words, a commander can choose to weight a course of action to error on the side of minimizing collateral damage when the law provides him room for maneuver, but little additional guidance.
16
Significantly for the U.S., the general trend for international law concerning warfare will continue to become more restrictive, as it is influenced by restive international opinion and policy-makers, particularly those in calmer corners of the globe where the public is outspoken at the horrors of modern war and to allegations of American hubris.
Third, military service as a profession invokes a special responsibility to the people of the state it serves. The values in military service include concepts of honor, duty, selfless service, integrity, competency, and ethics, which are instilled through socialization, education, and training. Huntington explains that officership, not unlike the medical profession or the profession of law, has three attributes that distinguish it as a profession: expertise, responsibility, and Martin L. Cook, regard to the resolution of military necessity, also have other practical benefits to the nation. In the conduct of war, minimizing unnecessary destruction and noncombatant casualties can set the stage for reconciliation at the termination of conflict. It can also encourage the enemy to surrender or motivate him to follow similar conduct. Consciously addressing this particular part of strategy in evaluating operational courses of action helps to fulfill Aquinas' axiom of building a better peace, or as Liddell Hart called it, "winning the peace."
19
In his 2002 State of the Union Address President Bush announced a new policy of preemption toward regimes that harbor global terrorists and manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD). From a moral standpoint this policy has drawn heated criticism from potential adversaries, neutrals, and allies alike, for it overturns the commonly accepted twentieth century view that only defensive wars (defense of a sovereign state or an aggressed ally) can satisfy the principles of jus ad bellum. Although the grounds for going to war (jus ad bellum) is not the subject of the monograph, one can quickly ascertain that when the reasons for going to war draw sharp criticism from a variety of quarters, then the conduct of war (jus in bello) will receive even greater scrutiny. An impassioned observer of the conflict will have difficulty separating the justice towards war from the justice in war conventions, as evidenced by critical comments made on regional cable networks and in print media over the recent conflict in Iraq.
Just war concepts still have relevance in how the U.S. fights its wars. Warfare is a rational human activity, which implies choices that a country must make in order to win, but to win with a longer view of fashioning conditions that prevent conflict in the future. 
ENVIRONMENT OF CONTEMPORARY WAR The Environment and Weapons of War Environment of War
Much literature exists about the current and future battlefield environment that U.S.
forces do and will operate in. Burgeoning populations in underdeveloped regions coupled with migrations of people in search of employment to urban areas, particularly near littoral and riparian areas, create tensions between the wealthy and poor, the technologically advanced and the agrarian classes. These are not necessarily new conditions. They have existed and accrued throughout the world since at least the early modern period; however, what is new is the that gap between rich and poor is widening by orders of magnitude and the information age is exposing this gap through all forms of media to an ever larger audience. Unfulfilled expectations of governments and authority have given rise to destructive ideologies shielded under the mantle of religion, and to international enterprises that generate wealth for a handful of criminals through illegal trade in humans, drugs, and weapons. Furthermore, regional powers, inimical to the U.S.
and its allies' interests, continue to use conventional and unconventional means to spread their influence and to subvert the international system of order.
U.S. foreign policy will demand that the U.S. military and the other elements of national power remain engaged in these areas to deter terrorist attacks, to counter narcotics and illicit goods trafficking, to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and to defeat conventional threats to regional stability. Access by the military to these regions is increasing, in part because improvements in strategic mobility have improved accessibility, but also due to the The location of the next battlefield is difficult to predict; however, general characteristics can be discerned from present and potential conflict areas. The environment is likely to feature enclosed spaces, such as urban or compartmentalized terrain, which will negate the advantage of extended-range ground fire systems that the U.S. enjoys. It will likely have a high degree of poverty among the population in urban settings with poor infrastructure, weak authority, and minimal healthcare and support facilities, which will require that U.S. forces perform OOTW functions simultaneously with combat operations. It will contain a mixture of non-combatants and combatants, living and working in close proximity with one another both materially and spatially, which makes target discrimination extremely problematic, and in some cases, the target unassailable. Combatants will likely ignore Geneva standards on conduct and uniform, which, although not obviating U.S. observance of Geneva standards, will frustrate soldiers, marines, and small unit leaders.
The Nature of Weapons
The weapons existence and use of such weapons is amoral until their use evinces a lack of discrimination or proportionality.
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Some argue that certain weapons are immoral simply because of the potential cruelty, suffering, and devastation that they might inflict upon an adversary. Weapons of this category often include chemical munitions, biological agents, nuclear weapons, and more recently cluster bombs, blinding lasers, and land mines. The arguments condemning these types as immoral center on both the proportionality criterion, for their tendency to overkill or create excessive suffering in their victims, and the discrimination criterion, due to the relatively large area affected which may include noncombatants. These concerns are legitimate; however, the debate is often clouded by arguments colored by perspectives of the parties involved. In some cases states that desire to ban such weapons neither have the capability to produce them nor do they face a viable threat that warrants a larger and more varied inventory of weapon systems. In other cases, particularly for biological weapons, even if they could be effectively weaponized, militaries cannot reliably control the negative consequences to domestic defense industry personnel and the environment once produced and unleashed. Indeed, for chemical and biological weapons, in addition to their horrible secondary effects, their banning by international law is justifiable simply because dangers to the environment and non-combatants from their production, handling, storage or use, outweigh any imaginable military benefit. 22 Conversely, in the instance of nuclear weapons the case has been made that the possession of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the Cold War was morally justified because its deterrence value kept wars limited and conventional, and should the need arise, they may continue to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction by malevolent states or actors. Charles Krauthammer, "On Nuclear 
Ethical Consequences of American Warfare Battlefield Dispersion
The increasing lethality and accuracy of weapons that precipitated with the advent of the rifled musket in the middle of the nineteenth century has produced a phenomenon known as battlefield dispersion that to this day appreciatively inclines combatants to spread farther afield in order to protect weapons, communications, and personnel from enemy attack. Through the use of technological innovations the U.S. military has proved masterful at developing systems and equipment that enable it to hide or disperse its personnel and weapons from its adversaries in wartime. This phenomenon is evident in the use of stealth technologies in aircraft, fire-and-forget weapons, and heat-reducing components in uniform material, but it is also manifest in how the U.S. fights. For instance, aircraft often fly above maximum enemy air defense altitudes, lasers guide missiles and rockets to their targets from hidden firing positions, satellite communications allow commanders to direct operations from regional or extra-regional command posts, and the infantry is used sparingly in direct combat when other means can safely attack from a distance.
Within U.S. military circles the trend toward battlefield dispersion has led to discreet use of its personnel and equipment in combat which in turn has led some to disparagingly conclude that the U.S. military is "risk averse;" however, this conclusion neglects the central and necessary component to battlefield dispersion, force protection, which every military endeavors to promote to the best of its capabilities.
With the phenomenon of battlefield dispersion comes mounting challenges to ethics in decision-making. The enemy, too, effectively uses battlefield dispersion to protect its force, particularly when confronted with a superior conventional threat as sophisticated as the U.S.
military. As the enemy disperses into urban or foliated areas, fights from protected sites, or dons clothing that is indiscernible from that of non-combatants around him, discrimination becomes extremely problematic. The activities by Iraqi para-military forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates how the enemy might dress in civilian garb or hide behind white surrender flags in order to entice U.S. military personnel to let down their guard before ambushing them.
The enemy may use non-combatants as "human shields" to protect key military facilities and personnel--a method of dispersion tantamount to protection in trenches--or even as decoys in military convoys to attract the munitions of U.S. indirect fire systems, as was suspected during NATO's Operation Allied Force over Yugoslavia in 1999. 24 In effect, an inferior enemy is likely to attempt to protect its force behind international condemnation for U.S. wartime activities.
Standoff and Targeting
Battlefield dispersion for the U.S. has led to increasing technological and operational innovations that efficiently enable attacking the enemy, his equipment, and facilities from a distance, effectively rendering them militarily unprotected, while protecting its own systems in space. However, attack from a distance degrades assurances of discrimination and proportionality. This section illustrates a few moral considerations that standoff presents.
Arguably, the U.S. military has the capability to strike almost anywhere at any time on the battlefield, but it is limited in its ability to detect a potential target, track it, and then discriminate it from non-combatants. Even once a legitimate target is identified, the problem then 24 On 14 April 1999 NATO planes attacked a convoy of Albanian refugees near Djakovica, Kosovo. NATO initially suspected that the Yugoslav Army had placed the refugees in a convoy with military vehicles to provoke an attack, but this was later found unsubstantiated. According to the UN prosecutor's report, the mistake occurred in part as a result of a series of events leading up to the attack and because the pilots could not distinguish military vehicles from tractors at the altitude they were flying. The pilots were not found criminally negligent. United Nations, Internet site: accessed 3 March 2003. therefore, requiring fewer sorties and munitions to attack and destroy a target. They also have the added benefit of minimizing collateral damage when used judiciously, because their circular error of probability (CEP) is marginal compared to that of so called "dumb" bombs. To be sure, any explosive device can cause considerable damage to its intended target and objects around it; however, the development of PGMs is testament to the acknowledgement by the U.S. that it can simultaneously improve lethality with an eye toward limiting collateral destruction. From the individual's perspective standoff dehumanizes conflict. It is safer and militarily more effective to attack from a Paladin artillery system or F-117 aircraft, secure in the knowledge that the enemy likely cannot strike back, than to place soldiers at risk on the ground. In training for warfare service members are conditioned to demonize the enemy in order to strengthen unit cohesion and to stiffen the resolve to fight the enemy. The alienation of the enemy, beginning with basic training, enables the soldier to kill reflexively without reflection upon his childhood socialization that taught him that killing is wrong.
27 Michael Walzer, using examples from the Spanish Civil War and World War II, illustrates the humanity of war. When soldiers happened upon an unsuspecting enemy soldier in a compromising position that all humans can relate to, for instance, taking a bath, smoking a cigarette, or using the latrine, the soldiers chose not to shoot the enemy, even though it was permissible under the laws of war. In effect, Walzer writes, in war the "alienation is temporary, the humanity is imminent." 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plans, Operations, and Doctrine
The complex nature of future battlefields combined with the manner in which the U.S.
fights operationally presents unique challenges to moral considerations for commanders. The dispersed battlefield, standoff attack, and the rapid tempo of operations make discrimination and control difficult, while correspondingly dehumanizing conflict for the combatants. Concomitant with the nature of this environment is domestic and international pressure to fight wars "cleanly" and quickly with minimal loss of life on all sides. This pressure, abetted by global media networks with instant satellite broadcasts that tend to dramatize conflict (as if it was not dramatic enough), often demands standards that are tougher than international law. Although the U.S.
cannot satisfy all critics of its methods of warfighting it can take measures to mitigate moral dilemmas. Notably, defining moral conduct often lies in the eye of the beholder, which presumes conditions must be met. First, the physical element (actus reus) identifies the act against noncombatants or property, and second, the mental element (mens rea) that identifies intention or recklessness. To pass the test for the mental element, the inquiry implies a requirement that commanders must conduct adequate reconnaissance and surveillance to identify legitimate targets. This system of reconnaissance must provide the commander sufficient information to allow him or her to make informed decisions as to secondary effects from targeting and finally this system or reconnaissance must be monitored to preclude accidental targeting of noncombatants or non-military objects that are superfluous to the military objective.
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Even though NATO was absolved of malfeasance in the indicated report, this article is significant for it describes an international inquiry into NATO's operational conduct. In the past such inquiries were usually directed toward individuals or isolated events and not toward the operations of a coalition, particularly a victorious coalition.
In practical terms this circumstance raises concerns for U.S. operational methods. Observer (FO) who identifies and lases an enemy truck in a village. His report cross-keys to a sensor on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which in turn passes the target location to a loitering F-16. Simultaneously, the commander at the operations center receives the digital report from the FO, reviews the UAV images, and discusses the implications for secondary effects with the pilot. The commander has used multiple systems to assess the target and quickly make a determination in attacking it.
Although this example is simplified, digital technology bodes well for the commander's appreciation of all elements in the battlespace; however, commanders must learn to harness the technology to limit the amount of information he or she receives to the essential elements needed to make informed decisions, while not filtering so much information that he or she misses critical pieces that form his or her understanding. Digital technology, however, will never completely eliminate the fog of war. Also, commanders must learn to adapt to an operations environment remarkably devoid of radio communications and the bustle of paper reports-the silent operations center-which demands that situational awareness be obtained by studying the icons on a monitor and conversing with relevant subject matter experts. In this environment commanders and staff must frequently meet to review plans and operations to share and sustain situational understanding. 
Education and Training
Education and training are institutional responsibilities that prepare the service member Even though a senior leader presumably has a strong personal moral foundation that enabled him or her to achieve a position of greater responsibility, professional virtues must be reinforced to maintain those virtues. This becomes important for making strong moral decisions during the stress of combat where "ethical actions do not simply occur, they are products of wisdom and 37 Ellwood P. Hinman, "Toward a Theory of Coercive Airpower for Post Cold-War Conflict," Air University Cadre Paper, no. 14, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2002), 38-9. 38 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., 31.
virtue annealed into habitually good education." 39 The leader is responsible to subordinates to demonstrate those virtues through good times and hard and to impart them through positive influence. The hierarchical structure of the military induces an inherent risk of breeding conditions for the unethical abuse of authority; therefore, it is incumbent upon the education system to inculcate ethical values in its leaders so a base is formed to which the leader defaults in difficult times. This applies equally to ethics in wartime as it does to other oft-sought virtues such as integrity, honor, valor, and loyalty. Training should be evaluated with measurable goals and upon completion of training it should be followed up with a comprehensive after action review. Just war tradition is an idea that no state is bound to observe, much less concur on the practical definitions of its principles; however, it is an idea whose observance can be comparatively measured in spite of the vagueness of the middle ground. Indeed, today it is unconscionable for the U.S. to destroy an adversary's city out of military necessity, nor is it any more feasible to avoid the city when the adversary's military is using the city to protect its forces behind human shields and protected facilities. The middle ground is the province in which the military commander needs guidance. The law of war provides direction on how to attack enemy forces within the city without violating the legal principles of proportionality, discrimination, and humanity; however, the law of war does not universally address every situation, nor should it attempt to. Just war values can provide the commander a means of weighing the relative merits of different courses of action when attempting to attack an adversary in the city, taking into consideration the law of war, operational requirements, and secondary effects. For instance, if the adversary is provisioning its forces from the city's central water facility and the commander acknowledges a legally substantiated need to prevent the enemy from drawing from the water source, then the commander may elect to attack the enemy's water supply point or water trucks rather than destroying the city's water facility that serves both combatants and non-combatants. This chapter provided a few recommendations for improving the commander's assay of his or her organization's observance of the moral conduct of war. Although no combination of recommendations, if adopted, can satisfy all demands for moral restraint in war, commanders can make measured and relative improvements toward operational ethics. The commander imparts the greatest impact within the areas of operations and plans, but a force well-indoctrinated in the practical application of the law of war elevates the organization's systemic moral conduct.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary American-style warfare requires continuous evaluation to ensure that the manner in which the U.S. fights reflects the values of just war tradition, values that are consistent with the laws of war and with American ideals. The U.S., perhaps more than any other country, has taken tremendous steps in minimizing collateral damage and non-combatant casualties while treating its adversary's military humanely when defeated. This point is abundantly evident by technological innovations that improve accuracy of weapons, the emphasis placed on legal counsel during operations, and the indoctrination of the force. However, with each successive improvement the standards are elevated and these measures sometimes do not prove demonstrably sufficient when considered in the context of the nature of contemporary American war, which relies heavily upon dispersion, standoff attack, and rapid maneuver, all managed from remote command and control centers.
Just war values remain relevant to the U.S. military today. Wartime moral considerations remain the concern of commanders, regardless of religion or personal beliefs, for they represent basic human morality that is espoused by every society. Just war values are inherent to the law of war and their observance assists the commander in upholding those statutes. They are also present in the cultural values of the professional officer corps, values that reflect the expectations of the American public. Finally, adherence to these values has a practical effect, both domestically and internationally. Effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy is tempered by perceptions of how the U.S. fights--perceptions by our adversaries and friends. As a recent article suggests, "neither ethics nor law, however, can answer all the questions that may arise on twenty-first century battlefields. Very often policy addresses the many gray areas that ethics and law do not necessarily enlighten, let alone resolve. Policy is critical because even where a particular course of action is technically moral and legal, there remains the important issue of perceptions.
Perceptions can materially affect the public support that military operations conducted by democracies require." 46 The emphasis of this monograph lies in the moral conduct of warfare (jus in bello), the domain in which military leaders have direct control; however, this does not absolve the military leader of his or her responsibility to the civilian leaders who determine justice toward war (jus ad bellum). It is incumbent upon the uniformed leadership to articulate to the policy-makers the potential risks of war and consequences of military action toward creating a better, more just peace. This is extremely important in light of the current U.S. policy of preemptive attack against regimes harboring global terrorists or manufacturing weapons of mass destruction.
The juxtaposition between military necessity and morality will become one of the most pressing issues for U.S. military decision-makers in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. 46 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., 26. 
